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STATEMENT OF THE CAffE 
In August of 1986, Respondent, Sharon Owen, through Johnson-
Bowles a local stockbroker, presented Certificates representing 
Twenty Thousand (20,000) shares of common voting stock of In-Tec 
International (U.S.A.), to Atlas Stock Transfer for transfer into 
the name of Johnco - the nominee for Johnson-Bowles Company so 
that a sale could be effected pursuant to Rule 144 of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. 
Sharon Owen was notified that the Company (In-Tec) had placed 
a stop transfer on the shares claiming int^ er-alia that Ms. Owen 
was not the owner of the shares and had not paid for them and 
further that Rule 144 had not been complied with. 
Atlas, pursuant to Section 70A-8-401 et. seq., Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended) waited thirty (30) days for In-Tec 
to either get a Court Order prohibiting the transfer or post a 
bond. When thirty (30) days passed, Atlas transferred the shares, 
but because of the conflicting claims, filed the interpleader 
action which is the current litigation. 
Contrary to the Appellant's statement of the case (Appellant's 
Brief at 5), the interpleader was not filed to determine "the 
number of shares of In-Tec stock to which Sharon Owen was entitled", 
but was filed only to determine ownership of the Twenty Thousand 
(20,000) shares of In-Tec stock in the name of Johnco represented 
by Certificates SL 0005916, SL 0005917 and SL 0005918. 
The issue of the reverse split was not raised in the complaint 
(1) 
filed by Atlas, nor was it raised in the answer filed by any of 
the defendants in the case. 
In-Tec became Seed Products International during the pendency 
of the litigation and installed new officers and directors. This 
new management raised the issue of the 20-1 reverse split for the 
first time at the time of trial. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court properly concluded, under principles of 
Estoppel, that In-Tec could not assert its own failure to file 
Articles of Amendment, as required by statute, for over six (6) 
months after a reverse split had been approved by Shareholders of 
In-Tec and given effect by the transfer agent of the Corporation, 
as a basis for claiming that shares issued to Sharon Owen after 
the meeting approving the reverse split were subject to the reverse 
split. 
ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court correctly held that the Twenty Thousand 
(20,000) shares of In-Tec stock issued to Sharon Owen on August 9, 
1984, were not subject to the 20-1 reverse split of shares approved 
by Shareholders of In-Tec on June 18, 1984. 
The sole question presented by this appeal is whether or not 
the Twenty Thousand (20,000) shares of Seed Products stock which 
the Trial Court held was owned * by Sharon Owen, which shares 
1 The Trial Court held that Sharon Owen was the owner of the 
Twenty Thousand (20,000) shares of In-Tec stock represented 
(2) 
were authorized to be issued to Sharon Owen by the In-Tec Board 
of Directors on July 11, 1984, are subject to a 20-1 reverse split 
which reverse split was approved by Shareholders of In-Tec June 18, 
1984, some three and one-half (3i) weeks prior to the Board action 
authorizing issuance of shares to Sharon Owen. 
The facts necessary to a determination of the legal issues in 
this matter are not in dispute. These facts are as set forth in 
Appellant's Statement of Facts with the following additions: 
1. The actions of the Shareholders on June 18, 1984, when 
the reverse split was authorized, authorized the reverse split 
of only the shares which were issued and outstanding at that 
time (See Ex. 13). 
2. Atlas Stock Transfer, the agent o£ the Corporation, gave 
effect to the reverse split effective June 18, 1984, and reversed 
the outstanding shares of the Corporation, being the total of the 
issued and outstanding shares of the Corporation on that date and 
the exact number which the Shareholders had authorized to be reversed, 
on the transfer and registrar records of the Corporation as of 
that date. 
Appellants argued that since the officers of the Corporation 
1 (Continued) 
by Certificates SL 0005916, SL 0005917 and SL 0005918 in the 
name of Johnco which shares were the subject matter of the 
interpleader action. Seed Products (formerly In-Tec) has 
not appealed the finding of the Trial Court that Sharon Owen 
is the legal owner of said shares. The only finding of the 
Court which was appealed was the question of whether the said 
Twenty Thousand (20,000) shares were subject to the 20-1 
reverse split, an issue which was not raised by Seed Products 
until the time of trial. 
(3) 
failed to file the Articles of Amendment from the May and June 
Shareholder's meetings until December, 1984, the shares of In-Tec 
issued to Sharon Owen, which all parties involved in the trans-
action understood not to be subject to the reverse split, must 
now be reverse split on a 20-1 basis. 
The Trial Court correctly concluded that since the Corporation 
had issued the shares in compromise and settlement of a debt owed 
to Sharon Owen for services to the Corporation, and the intent of 
the then existing Board of Directors was to issue post-split 
shares, and the fact that the transfer agent issued post split 
shares which were understood not to be subject to the split, the 
Corporation could not now come into Court and be heard to claim 
that since the Amendments were not filed with the State of Utah 
(a situation caused by the Corporation's own negligent failure to 
act) Sharon Owen's shares must be reverse split on a 20-1 basis. 
Respondent does not dispute that the statute (16-10-59) 
requires filing to make an Amendment effective. Respondent's claim 
is that the corporation is estopped to take advantage of its own 
failure to act as a basis for reversing a long-standing position 
taken by the Corporation, to-wit that the Owen shares were not 
subject to reversal. 
The cases cited by Appellant in its brief all involve situations 
where the Corporation seeks the benefit of Board action in situations 
where a filing with the state is necessary to authorize the Board 
to act. Such a situation is totally opposite to the situation 
where estoppel is claimed to keep a corporation, which has for 
(4) 
some unknown reason failed to make the necessary state filings 
to give effect to an act on which third parties have relied, from 
claiming its own failure to file as required by law as a defense 
to the claims of third persons who have acted in good faith on 
the representation of the Corporation that its acts are effective. 
Use of the legal doctrines of Estoppel in Pias and Quasi 
Estoppel have long been recognized as precluding such a result as 
sought by Appellant in this case. I 
The principle of Quasi Estoppel precludes a party from 
asserting, to anothers disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a 
position previously taken by him. The doctrine requires consistency 
of conduct when an inconsistency would cause injury to another. 
It precludes a party from taking advantage of his own fraud or 
wrongdoing. See 30 C.J. S. Estoppel § 107.| 
The principle of Quasi Estoppel requires no concealment of 
existing facts and no reliance. Its intent is to preclude a party 
from asserting, to anothers disadvantage, a right inconsistent with 
a position previously taken by him (in this case claiming the 
issuance of shares to Sharon Owen is subject to a 20-1 reverse 
split merely because the Corporation neglected to file Articles 
of Amendment until December, 1984, when it had represented to every-
one, including Sharon Owen, that the split had been effected June 18, 
and she was getting post split shares). See El Paso National 
Bank v. S.W. Numismatic Inv. Group, Ltd., 548 S.W. 2d 942,948 
(Tx. Civil App. 1977); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 251 S.e. 2d 441, 442, 
296 N.C. 574 (1979); Jordan v. Jordan, 271 S.E. 2d 450, 246 Ga. 
395 (1980). 
(5) 
Under the Doctrine of Quasi Estoppelf the regularity or 
validity of an act cannot be questioned by those who are responsible 
for itf and a person who prevents a thing from being done cannot 
later avail himself of the non-performance. Id. S e e Westinghouse 
Electric Corp. v. Pacific Gas and Electric, 326 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 
1964). In Rogers v. Hanson, 580 P.2nd 233, 234 (Utah 1978), this 
court held that "Generally, one is not permitted in a Court of 
Justice to take advantage of, or claim protection by reason of 
his own fraud." See In Re Unger, 220 N.Y.S. 2d 93, 28 Misc. 2d 513 
(1961). In the case of Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n. 
v. William L. Pereira and Associates, 401 P.2d 439, 16 Utah 2d 
365 (1965), this Court had an issue before it which was similar 
to the present case. The issue presented, as stated by the Court, 
was: 
,f[W]hether a foreign corporation doing business 
in Utah, which refuses or fails to comply with 
our statutes, can claim an advantage by its non-
compliance..." 401 P.2d at 441. 
The Court held it could not and stated: 
"The ancient and honored maxim that no one should 
benefit from his own wrong is particularly 
appropriate here." 
The same reasoning applies in the present case. Seed Products1 
predecessor corporations clearly held out to the world that the 
split had occurred prior to the settlement with Sharon Owen on 
the monies owed to her. It was the undisputed intent of the 
Board of the Corporation to issue post-split shares for settlement 
of the debt, and the transfer agent testified he did so. For 
some unknown reason the Corporation refused or failed to file 
(6) 
Articles of Amendment with the Corporations Division prior to 
issuing the shares. Howeverf Sharon Owen relied on getting post-
split shares in making her settlement, and took such shares in 
complete settlement of the debt owed by the Corporation. The 
reasoning in the Prudential Federal case controls. New management 
cannot, some three (3) years after the fact, take advantage of the 
Corporation's failure to file to effectively reduce the value of 
the settlement with Sharon Owen on a 20-1 basis.2 
Appellants argue the statute is mandatory. However, as stated 
by this Court in Rice v. Granite School District, 456 P.2d 159, 
162, 23 Utah 2d 22 (1969) "...estoppel may be found in the face 
of a mandatory statute." This principle appears to be uniformly 
accepted. See Crawford v. Thomas, 229 S.W. 2d 80 (Tex. 1950); 
Green v. State, 193 So. 312 (Ala. 1940). the Green case involved 
a mandamus action to require the Mayor and Alderman of a small 
town to canvas returns and declare and certify election results. 
The election had been ordered by a probate judge pursuant to law. 
It appeared that on the date set, the municipal election officers 
did not appear and so the election was held by the Election 
Inspectors as provided by law. The Mayor and Alderman failed for 
more than three (3) days to canvas the returns and declared the 
result and take steps to certify the election to state authorities 
as required by law to make the results official and binding under 
2 In the case of In Re Unger, Supra, the New York Court stated: 
One will not be allowed to bring about a condition by 
his own willful fact and then to further serve his 
purpose, be allowed to plead or take advantage of such 
condition. 220 N.Y.S. 2d at 97. 
(7) 
state law (it appared the election would cost the Mayor and 
Alderman their jobs by changing the form of government). 
The ultimate question was whether by their inaction in failing 
to comply with the statutory filings, the Mayor and Alderman could 
bring about the result they wanted. In holding this could not be 
allowed the Court stated: 
One will not be allowed to bring about a condition 
by his own willful act, and then to further serve 
his purpose, be allowed to plead or take advantage 
of such condition. 193 So. at 314. 
By accepting the benefit of the settlement contract and issuing 
Twenty Thousand (20,000) shares of In-Tec stock which everyone 
represented and understood to not be subject to the 20-1 reverse, 
Seed Products (formerly In-Tec) is estopped to question the vali-
dity of the shares even in the face of the Utah Statute § 16-10-59. 
Quasi Estoppel applies to transactions where, as in this case, 
it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a 
position inconsistent with one he ratified or acquiesed in See 
30 CJS Estoppel P. 589 N.66.50. In McDonald v. LeNore, 540 P.2nd 
671, 112 Ariz. 199 (1975) the Court stated: 
Quasi Estoppel differs from other forms of estoppel 
in that it appeals to the conscience of the Court 
to prevent injustice by precluding a party from 
asserting a right inconsistent with a position 
previously taken by him. 540 P.2d at 674. See Evans 
v. Idaho State Tax Comm., 540 P.2d 810, 812, 97 Ida. 
148 (1975). 
In the present case, to allow present management of the 
3 The principle of Equitable Estoppel requires consistency of 
position and conduct where inconsistency would work substantial 
injury to the other party. United Contractors, Inc., v. United 
Constuction Corporation, 187 So. 2d 695, 701 (Fla. 1966). 
(8) 
Corporation at this late date to take a position that the shares 
issued to Sharon Owen subsequent to the Shareholder approved 
reverse split and which were intended by the then Board of 
Directors of the Corporation to not be subject to the reverse 
split and which Sharon owen took in good faith reliance of their 
being post split shares would be unconscienable and an open 
invitation in the future to corporations to commit fraud by 
failing to make timely Amendments to their Articles of Incorporation. 
The failure to make the filing required by § 16-10-59 is solely 
the responsibility of the Corporation. Having failed to do so for 
whatever reason, yet having represented to the world that the 
split was effective, the Corporation cannot now be heard to deny 
the validity of the Amendment based upon its own failure to file. 
See Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. William L. 
Pereira and Assoc., Supra; Green v. State; Grover v. Gam, 464 
P.2d 598, 23 Utah 2d 441 (1970). 
As a general principle, the evidence at trial "is reviewed 
in a light most favorable to sustain the findings and judgment of 
the trier of fact. Rogers v. Hansen, Supra at 234. 
In the present case, the Trial Court found the shares to not 
be subject to the 20-1 reverse split and such result should be 
upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth hereinabove, the judgment of the 
Trial Court should be affirmed. 
(9) 
DATED this QJ^ day of October, 1987. 
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(10) 
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